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Abstract 
 
This paper employs survey experiments to examine the relationship between personality 
characteristics and positional concerns across a wide range of “goods,” e.g., income and 
market value of a car, and “bads,” e.g., infant mortality and poverty rates. Personality 
characteristics are measured using the five-factor model (Big-5), the locus of control, and 
the reciprocity. We demonstrate that there are significant relationships between personality 
types and positional concerns, which differ both by the type of personality and by the nature 
of a good. The results are highly consistent with the predictions presented in the field of 
personality psychology. That is, while agreeableness is negatively associated, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and external locus of control are positively associated with 
positional concerns for most goods. Importantly, there is also a substantial heterogeneity 
in the mean degree of positional concerns across the low and high values of most 
personality characteristics and goods. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research in social psychology and more recently in mainstream economics has yielded a 
bulk of evidence that personality characteristics are significantly correlated with a wide 
range of individual preferences and outcomes (e.g., Barrick and Mount, 1991; McCrae and 
Costa, 1999; Borghans et al., 2008). Economists seem to agree that the dimensions of 
personality can be used as a proxy for the innate abilities, or “non-cognitive” skills, e.g., 
memory, empathy, attention, imagination, and social skills (Almlund et al., 2011). Non-
cognitive skills have been shown to be correlated with outcomes including productivity, 
earnings, and wages (Osborne, 2005; Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Hackman et al., 2006; 
Mueller, G. and E. Plug, 2006; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Uysal et al., 2011), job 
performance and job satisfaction (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Tett et al., 1991; Van den Berg 
and Feij, 1993; Judge et al., 2002), workplace deviance (Salgado, 2002), leadership and 
academic/career success (Judge et al., 1999; 2002), unemployment dynamics (Cuesta and 
Budría, 2012), well-being (DeNeve and Cooper, 1998) as well as several preference 
parameters, i.e., time preferences, risk aversion, altruism, and social preferences, which 
play a crucial role in economics (Borghans et al., 2008; Backer et al., 2012). 
 
One important issue is how personality characteristics are related to positional concerns 
(“status” or “relative” concerns), i.e., that people’s utility is affected not only by their own 
level of consumption but also by their consumption level relative to that of comparable 
others (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark et al., 2008; 
Carlsson et al., 2007; Akay et al., 2013). The literature on positional concerns, which uses 
both experimental and life-satisfaction survey datasets, has been growing and several 
studies demonstrate that positional concerns are strongly related to people’s utility in a 
varying degree across types of goods (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005), levels of economic 
development and growth (Easterlin, 1995; Senik, 2004), and people’s observed 
characteristics (Akay and Martinsson, 2018).1 The literature has already identified 
                                                 
1There is a rapidly developing literature on positional concerns. The literature mostly uses either subjective 
well-being measures, e.g., life satisfaction or happiness, or stated preferences methods to identify the direct 
utility effect of positional concerns (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; Clark et al., 2008). A bulk of the papers 
suggests that the positional concerns - measured using “relative income” or income “rank” on subjective 
well-being - negatively influence well-being especially in developed countries (Clark et al., 2008). There is 
a substantial heterogeneity in positional concerns across the development level of countries. The positional 
concerns seem to be lower among countries which are poor (e.g., Akay et al., 2011). In line with the 
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important implications of these concerns in relation to a wide range of economic issues 
spanning from labor supply (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998) to migration (Akay et al., 
2017) and how to optimize taxation to alleviate the negative impact of positional concerns 
on people’s utility (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenmann, 2014). 
 
However, how positional concerns are related to people’s “hard-wired” characteristics such 
as personality characteristics, genetics, or physiology remains largely unknown. Recently, 
using panels of subjectively reported well-being datasets and fixed-effects model 
specifications, Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2018) and Cuesta and Budria (2015) 
reported that the influence of relative income position, proxied using income “ranks” 
within the income distributions of people’s reference groups, on subjective well-being, i.e., 
life-satisfaction, varies greatly depending on the respective person’s specific personality 
traits. The current paper contributes to this limited literature in two aspects: First, we 
investigate the relationship between personality characteristics and positional concerns 
using tailored stated choice experiments. One important advantage of this approach is that 
it identifies the direct utility effect of personality on the degree of positional behavior, 
which might not be easy to capture with the subjective well-being data. Second, we 
investigate the relationship between personality and positionality not only for income 
comparisons but also for comparisons with respect to a wide range of an alternative set of 
goods.  
 
To ensure comparability with the existing literature, our baseline good is income/month 
after tax, and we use the Big-5 personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness-to-experience), internal/external locus of 
control (ILOC and ELOC hereafter), and positive/negative reciprocity (PR and NR 
hereafter) as personality characteristics (e.g., Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018).2 The 
stated choice experiment is then extended to allow an alternative set of goods that are also 
expected to be consumed in different levels by personality types. Second, we experiment 
on the market value of a luxury car, which might be considered an “inherently” positional 
                                                 
subjective well-being approach, the stated preference methods suggest that people have positional 
preferences with respect to not only income but also other goods such as the consumption value of a car or 
vacation days (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005). 
2The inventories presented in Appendix B are obtained from the questionnaire used in the 2009 wave of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (see www.diw.de for the questionnaires and detailed information). 
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good. Third, we experiment with a public good using overall health expenditures in a 
country. In the paper, we refer to these first three items as “goods” as they involve positive 
and desirable elements. The experiment is then extended to include “bads” involving 
disutility and undesirable aspects including an item relating to leisure-work balance, 
working hours/week, and two public “bads” as infant mortality rates (per 1000), and 
poverty rates (%).  
 
We present highly robust findings that are consistent with the existing literature using both 
life-satisfaction (e.g., Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018) and experiment data (e.g., Van 
der Zee et al., 1996, 1998). First of all, most personality characteristics are significantly 
related to positional concerns. Among Big-5 personality characteristics, we find strong 
evidence that agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism are significantly related 
to positionality. More specifically, agreeableness is negatively related to positionality 
while conscientiousness and neuroticism are positively related. There is a significant 
negative relationship between extraversion and positional concerns only for “bads.” There 
is no particularly strong relationship between openness-to-experience and positional 
concerns. While ILOC is weakly related to positionality, a significant positive relationship 
is found for ELOC, which is also highly consistent with the literature. We find a negative 
and significant relationship between PR and positional concerns only for the “bads.” We 
also conduct an extensive heterogeneity analysis that involves both parametric and non-
parametric methods to unveil how positional concerns vary across levels of personality 
characteristics. One important result is that positional concerns are strong and statistically 
significantly different from the overall mean level of positionality mostly among people 
who score lower on each personality trait. For people with medium-to-high levels of most 
personality characteristics, the degree of positionality is about the same as the overall mean 
level of positionality.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
experiment setup, personality measures and hypotheses, and gives a summary of the 
experiment. Section 3 explains the econometric approaches and estimators used. Section 4 
presents the main results of the experiment, a robustness analysis, and an extensive 
heterogeneity analysis based on parametric and non-parametric models. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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2. The Experiment 
 
The survey experiment was conducted in a large lecture hall at Istanbul University in 2014 
using 307 undergraduate students in the disciplines of economics, psychology, and law.3 
Experimental assistants explained the experiment to the respondents at the beginning of 
the session. The experiment consisted of two parts. First, the respondents answered a series 
of hypothetical stated choice questions. We used these responses to identify their degree of 
positional concerns. In the second part, the respondents were given a follow-up 
questionnaire, the responses to which we used to elicit several individual socio-
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, personality measures as well as other 
data concerning the respondents’ attitudes, emotions, and feelings. At the end of the 
experiment, the participants received a pocket book, the value of which equaled the average 
labor market value of the time spent completing the experiment.  
 
2.1. Identification of Positionality 
 
Preferences. The main objective of the experiment is to identify how degree of positional 
concern is related to personality characteristics for alternative sets of goods. To be able to 
measure the degree of positional concern, we specify a utility function 𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑔(𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔,𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔) 
that is additive in relative 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 and absolute 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 consumption levels of each good 𝑔𝑔 
(e.g., Akerlof, 1997; Knell, 1999): 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑔𝑔(𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔,𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔)  = (1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔)𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔(𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔),                                                        (1)                                                                                       
 
where 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 is the parameter measuring the marginal degree of positional concern, i.e., the 
fraction of the marginal utility that is due to the increase in relative consumption of good  
𝑔𝑔. Equation (1) assumes that people compare their consumption level of a good with a 
reference (or comparison) consumption level 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 of their reference group, e.g., others in 
their society. In order to investigate the relationship between personality and positional 
                                                 
3According to the Turkish law, the experiment did not require an ethical committee approval and there was 
no institutional review board for the social sciences in the Istanbul University by the time of our experiment, 
2014. 
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concern, an individual-specific measure for the marginal degree of positional concerns 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 𝑠𝑠hould be identified. To this end, we tailored an experiment involving binary choices 
between two societies that differed in terms of absolute and relative consumption levels. 
The levels of consumption of each good were specifically selected from the indifference 
curves of utility function (1) for a set of degree positionality 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 for each good 𝑔𝑔. 
 
Setup. In the first step of the experiment, the respondents were asked to make a series of 
decisions regarding where their imaginary grandchild should live given a certain 
hypothetical scenario (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; 
Akay et al., 2013).4 More specifically, the respondents were asked to choose one of two 
societies for their future grandchild, i.e., Societies (A) and (B), which only differ in terms 
of their absolute and relative amount of consumption of each good. The scenario and an 
example choice situation (in Figure 1) were carefully described to the respondents just 
before the experiment started. The respondents were specifically informed that the prices 
and consumption levels of all other goods were identical in the two hypothetical societies 
(see Figure 1).  
 
Having the scenario presented, an example choice situation, which is very similar to 
choices that respondents are going to make, is carefully described to respondents by 
experimental assistants. The choice situation used as an example reads as follows: In 
Society (A), the respondent’s hypothetical future grandchild’s monthly after-tax income is 
TRY 2,000, while the average monthly after-tax income amounts to TRY 2,500.5 In Society 
(B), the future grandchild’s monthly after-tax income is TRY 1,800, while the average 
monthly after-tax income in this society is TRY 1,500. Thus, the future grandchild would 
be TRY 200/month richer in Society (A) than in Society (B) in absolute terms, yet would 
earn TRY 2,000– 2,500 =  500 less per month than the average income earned by other 
people in society. That is, despite having less money, the future grandchild would be better 
off in relative terms in Society (B), as the grandchild would enjoy TRY 1,800– 1,500 = 300 more in monthly income than the average person in that society. In effect, by choosing 
                                                 
4The hypothetical choice situation used in our experiment concerned an imaginary future relative and not the 
respondents themselves. The idea behind this is to increase the respondents’ degree of reflection on their 
hypothetical decisions to make the decision more realistic to decrease potential hypothetical bias (see, e.g., 
Alpizar et al., 2005, and Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001, for a comprehensive discussion). 
5TRY 1 equaled about USD 0.31 at the time of the experiment.  
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Society (B), respondents stated a particular degree of positional concern which is implicit 
in the assigned income levels. 
  
 
In our survey experiment, respondents are asked to make repeated binary choices that vary 
in implicit degree of positional concerns. What we mean by “implicit” is that we select 
specific consumption levels of each good so that the distance between absolute and relative 
amounts in two societies corresponds to a particular degree of positionality 𝜃𝜃 in each choice 
situation.6 The logic of the design can be described as follows: If a respondent is indifferent 
between living in Society (A) and Society (B), then the respondent implies that 
𝑈𝑈�𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔,𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔� = 𝑈𝑈�𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔,𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔� for a good 𝑔𝑔 (after-tax income/month in this case). 
                                                 
6To be realistic, the levels of consumption of each good are specifically determined by considering the actual 
life conditions of our respondents. We apply alternative strategies to determine the hypothetical levels of 
consumption of each good. For income, we simply use the average per capita income level in Turkey at the 
time of the experiment. The market value of a car is determined by calculating the average price of top-
selling cars in the country. Weakly working hours is referenced to full time. We aimed to use realistic levels 
for the infant mortality and poverty rates considering the levels realized in Turkey and in other countries at 
the time of the experiment.  
Figure 1. The Scenario and Example Choice Situation
In this part of the questionnaire we require you to choose which society you consider to be the best one for an
imaginary person living two generations into the future. You can, for example, imagine a grandchild, great
grandchild or another relative that you are choosing for. By ‘best’ we mean the society in which your future
relative will be most content.
•      The difference between the societies is the income level or the amount of consumption for a certain good of
your future relative, and the average income and consumption of the society.
•      The variety of goods and their prices are the same for both societies. For 100 TRY you can buy the same
goods and the same amount in both societies. Prices are expressed in today’s price level.
•      It is important that you focus your answer on what is in the best interest of the imagined person, and nothing
else. There is no “correct” response to these questions and we ask you to reflect on the choices carefully.
Example : In the example below your future relative earns 200 TRY/month more in society A compared with
society B. You can also see that your future relative earns 500 TRY/month less than the average income in
society A and 300 TRY/month more than the average in society B.
        Society A:         – Your relative’s income is 2,000 TRY/month after tax
                                  – The average income in society is 2,500 TRY/month after tax
        Society B:         – Your relative’s income 1,800 TRY/month after tax
                                  – The average income in society is 1,500 TRY/month after tax
We require you to choose which society you consider to be the best one for your future relative; that is, the
society in which your future relative will be most content. It is important that you focus your answer solely on
this; that is: which society is the best for your future relative? You should not consider which society is best on 
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In the case of utility function (1), we can write 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔 − 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔 − 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 and the 
marginal degree of positional concerns is 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 = 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔/𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 − 𝑌𝑌𝐵𝐵𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔. In the example 
choice situation, if the respondent chooses to live in Society (A), then the marginal degree 
of positional concern is 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 = 2,000 − 1,800 2,500 − 1,500⁄ = .20, implying that the 
respondent’s degree of positionality is at least .20 (𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 > .20) for after-tax income/month. 
That is, the design cannot identify the exact degree of positional concerns of respondents. 
However, we can observe the level of positionality in intervals by asking repeated 
questions with varying implicit degree of positional concerns. In the experiment, the 
respondents were asked to answer three sequential questions for each good and their 
answers provide information for the upper and lower bound of positionality in intervals 
𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 ≤ .25, . 25 < 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 ≤ .50, . 50 < 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 ≤ .75, 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 > .75, which are implicit in the 
consumption levels assigned for each good (see Appendix A for three choice situations for 
income). Using the stated preferences of respondents for each good, we then aim to 
estimate the mean level of 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 for each good 𝑔𝑔 in relation to the personality characteristics 
of respondents. 
 
Summary of the Experiment. The survey experiment included six goods which differ in 
several aspects. The experiment is summarized in Table 1, where we present own and 
others’ consumption levels for each good and the share of respondents who chose the 
positional alternative for each choice situation. The first and second columns show the 
imaginary grandchild’s level of consumption and the consumption level of other people, 
respectively. For each good, we determined a Society (A) and three (B) societies, i.e., B(1), 
B(2), and B(3), for which the consumption levels were chosen to correspond to an 
increasing implicit marginal degree of positionality (.25, .50, and .75) for each good (third 
column).7 
 
The raw shares of respondents who chose the positional alternative in the respective choice 
situations are given in the fourth column. The overall raw mean shares of respondents who 
chose Society (B) across three choice situations for each good are given in bold. The raw 
mean shares of positional choice are heterogeneous across goods. The share is .52 for 
income, and the respondents showed the lowest positional concerns for working hours/ 
                                                 
7 Note that there are tiny variations in the implicit marginal degree of positional concerns. This is due to the 
rounding of each goods to a reasonable unit to approximate 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. 
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week, at .39, and the highest for the market value of a car, at .56. One expected result is 
that the shares of respondents who chose the positional alternative fall when the implicit 
degree of positionality is higher. Raw results suggest that the mean share of positional 
choice tends to be lower (.42) for the “bads” involving disutility (working hours/week) and 
suffering (infant mortality rates (per 1000) and poverty rates (%)) than for the “goods” 
(.55) (after tax income/month, market value of a car, and overall health expenditures). 
Mann-Whitney-U test suggests that the difference is highly statistically significant (p-value 
< .001). The overall raw mean share of positional choice across all choice situations and 
goods is .48. This value is highly similar to the findings in previous studies using similar 
   
 10 
samples and methods (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Alpizar et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 
2007; Akay et al., 2013).8  
 
One important remark is that we assume our respondents are utility-maximizing agents and 
as such should comply with the standard assumptions of utility-maximizing behavior. 
However, in reality, some respondents may act inconsistently by switching back and forth 
between societies and violates the transitivity assumption, e.g., choosing Society (A) at the 
first-choice situation and then choosing Society (B) in the second- of third-choice situation. 
We identify all inconsistent respondents for each good and then calculate their share out of 
all respondents. The results presented in the second to last column of Table 1 suggest that 
the shares of respondents who responded inconsistently are similar across the goods and 
vary from 7.5% (infant mortality rate) to 12.6% (market value of a car). We will exclude 
these respondents from the sample in our empirical analysis. The final sample size is given 
in the last column of Table 1 for each good.  
 
2.2. Measures of Personality Characteristics 
 
The Big-5 Measure of Personality. The model is one of the widely used taxonomy in the 
psychology and recently in economics, as it offers an integrative framework to understand 
individual differences in broader categories (for a comprehensive review see McCrae and 
Costa, 1997). The measure is based on 15 subjective questions, which are presented in 
Table B.1 (in Appendix B). The Big-5 personality measure identifies personality in five 
categories labelled extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness-to-
experience, and neuroticism (or emotional stability when reversed). Respondents are asked 
to provide a response to each question, or statement, in the inventory using a 7-point scale 
where 1 means “it does not apply at all” and 7 “it applies fully.” In a next step, Big-5 
personality measures are calculated by adding the response scores for the three questions 
for each personality category and thus, each of the five measures obtained ranges from 3 
to 21 (please see Table B.1 for the calculation of Big-5 personality characteristics). Each 
                                                 
8This result is well in line with previous findings in the literature. Using a similar sample and an experiment 
conducted in Turkey, Istanbul, Akay et al. (2013) find a mean share of positional choice of about .40. The 
degree of positional behavior observed in these sorts of stated choice experiments differs across countries, 
ranging from .10–.20 (e.g.., Ethiopia, Akay et al., 2011) to .70–.80 (e.g.., Sweden, Johannson-Stenman et 
al., 2002).  
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individual has a specific combination of the five mutually non-exhaustive characteristics, 
and each Big-5 personality characteristic is expected to be associated with specific attitudes 
and types of behavior.  
 
A priori predictions about how Big-5 personality types relate to positional behavior might 
be difficult and the degree of correlation might also differ across the levels of each 
personality type and also on the type of good under consideration. Using information from 
the field of personality psychology, we suggest a series of hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between personality and positional concerns as follows. A high score on 
extraversion is associated with a higher frequency social interactions and ambition, which 
in turn may be correlated with a higher positional concern. Indeed, evidence shows that 
extraverts value their status at work, for instance (Barrick et al., 2002; Landis and 
Gladstone, 2017). Thus, the relationship between extraversion and positional behavior is 
expected to be positive. However, we note that these individuals are also friendly, seeking 
friendship, and sympathetic with others’ gains and losses, which might correlate negatively 
with positional concerns. That is, while extraverts might enjoy a status reward of having a 
higher position, they might also be sympathetic to the circumstances of comparable others, 
e.g., friends. Thus, the relationship between extraversion and positional concerns might be 
masked depending on the weights of these counteracting dimensions of extraversion. 
 
A high score on agreeableness is associated with cooperative behavior and altruism, which 
might be associated with weaker positional concerns (McCrae and Costa, 1999). These 
individuals are highly motivated for work and tend to avoid conflict with others and display 
less workplace deviation, which might also be related to lower levels of positional 
concerns, especially with respect to working hours (Salgado, 2002; Graziano and Tobin, 
2002). Yet at the lower end of agreeableness, the positional behavior might look 
substantially different. Individuals scoring low on agreeableness might exhibit “spiteful” 
behavior and may tend to punish others if they perceive their status as a threat, which in 
turn may go hand in hand with stronger positional concerns (Marcus et al., 2014). 
Conscientiousness relates to hard work, work ethnics, self-discipline, competition, and a 
higher degree of goal-oriented behavior. A higher score on this factor relates to welfare 
positively and these individuals are more reactive to changes in their income and the 
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behavior of others (Boyce and Wood, 2011). Thus, a high level of conscientiousness might 
be associated with a higher level of positional concerns. 
 
Neuroticism is associated with negative emotions, depression, and lower levels of life 
satisfaction. A higher score in this area is expected to be positively correlated with 
positionality as these individuals seek (mostly downward) comparisons to enhance their 
mood (Van der Zee et al., 1996; 1998; Buunk et al., 2002). Finally, openness-to-experience 
is associated with diverse social interactions, valuing arts, and a tendency to socialize with 
people who represent different values and cultures. While a higher score on the openness-
to-experience might be positively related to positional concern, as it would in the case of 
extraversion, this personality trait might lead to less positional behavior if these individuals 
use the information gained from the experiences and interaction with others to improve 
their status in the future (as in the case of “tunnel effect” of Hirschman and Rothschild, 
1973). Thus, the direction of the relationship is unknown a priori.  
 
Internal and External Locus of Control. This model of personality aims to measure 
internal and external aspects of the degree of autonomy in the life decisions and actions of 
individuals (Rotter, 1966). That is, it measures the degree to which individuals believe that 
they can control their own life decisions and the outcomes they lead to. There are two 
dimensions called internal and external locus of control, i.e., ILOC and ELOC. ILOC is a 
measure of the belief that an individual has control over one’s decisions and their outcomes. 
ELOC is a measure of how much individuals believe that external forces, e.g., other people, 
society, luck, or fate, determine their life outcomes. To measure ILOC and ELOC, we use 
Rotter’s (1966) inventory, which is based on the ten questions, or statements, presented in 
Table B.2 (in Appendix B). Respondents are expected to respond to each question using a 
7-point scale (1 = “it does not apply at all” and 7 = “it applies fully”). ILOC is measured 
as the sum of the response scores for questions Q1, Q6, and Q9, and can therefore range 
from 3 to 21. ELOC is measured by adding up the response scores for the remaining seven 
questions and can therefore range from 7 to 49.  
 
There is substantial evidence that a higher ILOC score is positively correlated with career 
success, job performance, and income among many other outcomes (e.g., Caliendo et al., 
2014; Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Andrisani, 1981; Strauser et al., 2002; McGee 
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and McGee, 2016; Heineck and Anger, 2010; Piatek and Pinger, 2010; and see Cobb-Clark, 
2015 for a comprehensive discussion).9 While these individuals are expected to display 
weaker positional concerns, as they are successful in general and do not depend on others’ 
behavior, they might also experience stronger positional concerns as they regularly set 
higher goals to challenge them (Cobb-Clark, 2015). For instance, it is possible that higher 
consumption levels among others might be a pushing factor for people with higher ILOC 
scores. Thus, no a priori prediction can be made regarding the direction of the relationship 
between ILOC scores and degree of positionality. However, though not symmetrically, a 
higher ELOC score might be related to a dependency on others’ behavior (Cobb-Clark and 
Schurer, 2013). Thus, individuals with high ELOC scores might engage in a high degree 
of comparisons with other people’s consumption levels.  
 
Positive and Negative Reciprocity. Reciprocity has to do with how a person responds to 
another person’s behavior (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Dohmen et al., 2009; Caliendo et 
al., 2014; Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018). That is, it has to do with the degree to 
which a person tends to respond with kindness to kind behavior and unkindly to unkind 
behavior. Literature suggests that there are differences in the degree of responses to kind 
and mean behavior, and these differences are measured on two subscales for positive and 
negative reciprocity (PR and NR), respectively. The reciprocity inventory is presented in 
Table B.3 (in Appendix B). It is based on six questions, or statements. To calculate a 
person’s PR score, we sum up the responses to questions Q1, Q4, and Q6, and we do the 
same thing with the responses to the remaining questions to calculate the person’s NR 
measure. This aspect of a person’s personality is also measured using a 7-point scale, and 
a person’s total PR and NR scores can range from 3 to 21.  
 
The reactions of individuals to other people’s behavior and attitudes are expected to differ 
based on how they perceive their and others’ position and depending on the type of good. 
Higher PR scores are associated with higher levels of cooperation, which may imply less 
                                                 
9A general finding is that the internal locus of control is associated with positive outcomes including more 
human capital accumulation and educational attainment (Piatek and Pinger, 2015), better earning returns 
(Osborne, 2005), upward wage mobility (Schnitzlein and Stephani, 2013), more efficient job searching 
(Caliendo et al., 2015; McGee, 2014), a higher probability of entrepreneurship (Caliendo et al., 2014), and 
better personal health (Cobb-Clark et al., 2014).  
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concern about one’s relative consumption level. In contrast, people with high NR scores 
might display lower levels of cooperative behavior, trust and also well-being (Dohmen et 
al., 2009; Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018). They are also expected to be more 
positional in nature, especially if they perceive higher positions of others as a “threat” that 
might lead them to retaliate with a more positionally oriented behavior, in particular for 
inherently status goods. 
 
3. Econometric Specifications 
 
The Model. The repeated nature of our experimental setup allows us to identify the degree 
of positionality 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔 in intervals (−∞ < 𝜇𝜇1], (𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2], … , [𝜇𝜇𝑉𝑉,∞) for each repeated choice 
situation or version 𝑣𝑣 = 1, … ,𝑉𝑉 for each good 𝑔𝑔. In our case, 𝑉𝑉 = 3 and the interval 
boundaries are a priori known, 𝜇𝜇1 = .25, 𝜇𝜇2 = .50, 𝜇𝜇3 = .75, while the global lower and 
upper boundaries of positionality intervals are set to be censored. To be able to estimate 
the mean degree of positional concerns conditional on personality characteristics, we 
specify the following model: 
  
𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 = 𝐗𝐗′𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝚷𝚷′𝑝𝑝𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝+𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔,                                                                                       (2) 
 
where 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 is the latent (marginal) degree of positional concern with respect to good 𝑔𝑔 for 
each individual 𝑖𝑖. 𝐗𝐗 is a matrix containing a set of control variables consisting of age, 
gender, household income (seven category dummies), household size, number of siblings, 
health-status (four dummies), university department enrolled at (dummies for economics, 
psychology, and law), and dummies for each good depending on the specification. 𝛽𝛽 is the 
corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The model also includes a subjective 
measure of attitude to inequality 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, i.e., subjective inequality aversion, to alleviate the 
potential bias due to omitted variables and 𝛼𝛼 is the parameter to be estimated.10 The model 
specification in equation (2) controls for personality characteristics in 𝚷𝚷, in separate 
                                                 
10To measure subjective inequality aversion, we asked the respondents to rate their opinions regarding 
inequality on two 7-point scales, one ranging from “income should be more equal as incentive” (1) to “we 
need larger income differences for higher effort” (7) and the other from “an egalitarian society where the 
gap between rich and poor is small, regardless of achievement” (1) to “a society, where wealth is distributed 
according to ones’ achievement” (7). To construct the scale, we simply sum response scores from these two 
questions and include in our baseline model specification. 
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regressions for Big-5 traits, locus of control, and reciprocity. To allow for some flexibility 
on the relationship between personality and positional concerns, we use log-transformed 
personality characteristics for each type. 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 is the corresponding vector for each personality 
measure 𝑝𝑝. Finally, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔 is the usual error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
Estimators. The model specification in (2) is an interval regression in which we use the 
marginal interval of positionality as dependent variable for each individual. Using the 
normal distribution assumption, the probability that a respondent’s degree of positionality 
is in a particular positionality interval is 
 Pr�𝜇𝜇1 < 𝜃𝜃� ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣+1� = Φ(𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣+1|𝐗𝐗,𝛽𝛽, 𝜆𝜆) −Φ(𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣|𝐗𝐗,𝛽𝛽, 𝜆𝜆),                                                (3)   
 
where Φ(. ) is the standard normal distribution function. The likelihood function for the 
uncensored observations is: 
 ln (ℒ(𝛽𝛽|𝐗𝐗) = ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑣𝑣ln [Φ(𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣+1|𝐗𝐗,𝛽𝛽, 𝜆𝜆) −Φ(𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣|𝐗𝐗,𝛽𝛽, 𝜆𝜆)]𝑉𝑉=3𝑣𝑣=1𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ,                                (4) 
 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑣𝑣 is a dummy variable indicating the positional choice of individual i for the 
experimental version v. The global lower and upper bounds can also be chosen arbitrarily 
or set to be censored below zero and above one. In our baseline model specification (2), 
we consider them as censored. Yet we also compare estimation results with the neutral 
choice as 0 for the lower boundary of the first and 1 for the upper boundary of the last 
interval. Then, by calibrating the likelihood function (4) for the censored observations, the 
estimates of 𝛽𝛽 and 𝜆𝜆 can be obtained by maximizing (4).  
 
The model specification in equation (2) is also estimated with alternative model 
specifications to investigate the robustness of the results. First, an ordered probit model, 
which maps the marginal positionality intervals on an increasing ordinal sequence and 
allows unknown cut-off points for the positionality intervals, is estimated. Second, binary 
choice models are estimated by assuming that an individual makes binary decisions in each 
choice situation. Third, the repeated nature of the experimental data is exploited to allow 
for the unobserved individuals effects in the model specifications. A panel dataset is 
defined over the respondents and repeated choices (as time dimension of the panel data) 
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and panel data (Mundlak type) correlated random-effects models are estimated based on 
alternative auxiliary functions of unobserved individual heterogeneity. The characteristics 
used in the auxiliary distributions are well-being (e.g., positive and negative moods, 
feelings and happiness), emotions (e.g., envy) and self-esteem among others. Detailed 
results from using alternative estimators will be presented in our robustness analysis. 
Finally, a non-parametric estimator, i.e., Spearman-Karber, which is robust to violation of 
parametric assumptions and sample size, will also be employed when we predict the mean 
degree of positionality in relation to low and high levels of each personality trait.  
 
4. Results 
 
When presenting our empirical results, we first look at the results obtained by combining 
all goods and then we present the heterogeneity in the positional concerns for “goods” and 
“bads,” and also for each good separately. Second, we present the results from our 
robustness checks focusing on model specifications, confounding factors, and 
experimental biases. Finally, we conduct an extensive heterogeneity analysis to investigate 
how mean degree of positional concern vary across the levels of each personality trait. 
 
4.1. How do Personality Characteristics Relate to Positional Behavior? 
 
Main Results. We first focus on the sign and significance of personality characteristics on 
the marginal degree of positional concern. For reasons of brevity, the tables present results 
only for personality measures.11 First, we merge the experimental data obtained from all 
experimented goods in one dataset and estimate equation (2). In this model specification, 
the dependent variable is the lower and upper boundary value of the marginal positionality 
interval for each individual over all goods. Having deleted the inconsistent respondents and 
missing information, the total sample consists of 1,544 respondent-good observations. The 
main estimation results of the relationship between personality and positionality for all 
goods combined are given in Column I of Table 2. First of all, among the Big-5 personality  
 
                                                 
11The results of other control variables are highly consistent with the previous literature. Female, less healthy, 
and relatively poor respondents show weaker positional concern. The subjective measure of inequality 
aversion is negatively and significantly related to positional concerns, as expected. The full estimation 
results can be obtained from the authors. 
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characteristics, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism are significantly related 
to positionality after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, inequality aversion, 
and indicators for goods. Also, the signs of the estimated parameters are well in line with 
the predictions discussed above and those in the literature (e.g., Budria and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2018). Agreeableness is negatively associated with positionality, while 
conscientiousness and neuroticism are positively related. The sign of extraversion and 
openness-to-experience is negative but they are not statistically significant on positional 
concerns. The results for ILOC and ELOC are presented in the second block of Table 2, 
Column I. Both variables are positively related to positional concerns, yet only ELOC is 
statistically significant, in line with our predictions and the literature. In the final block, we 
present the results for PR and NR. The negative sign of the estimated parameter of PR and 
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the positive sign of the estimated parameter of NR are also consistent with the predictions. 
On average, there is no significant relationship between reciprocity and positional behavior 
when we combine all goods. 
 
Do the Results Differ between “Goods” and “Bads”? We will now investigate the 
heterogeneity on the relationship between personal concerns and positionality by some 
characteristics of goods. To this end, before presenting, we combine the data from after-
tax income/month, market value of a car, and overall health expenditures experiments as 
“goods,” and the remaining three items, working hours/week, poverty and infant mortality 
rates, as “bads.” Columns II and III present results for the “goods” and “bads” obtained 
from the baseline model specification (2). These results are highly consistent with those in 
Column I, with some exceptions. The parameter estimates of conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and ELOC have the same sign and significance levels as in the baseline figures 
in Column I. Other than that, there are some important differences between the columns 
that should be highlighted. First, positional concerns of extraverts react differently to 
“goods” and “bads.” These individuals exhibit significantly lower positional concerns 
regarding “bads” than “goods”, possibly because of their higher levels of friendliness and 
sympathy. A higher score on agreeableness is significantly associated with positional 
concerns only for “bads.” Conscientious individuals are also slightly more positional 
regarding the “bads” (.11 vs. .21), yet this difference is not statistically significant (p-value 
= .125), on average. People with a high conscientiousness score might desire and believe 
they deserve to live in a better society given their high level of work effort and discipline. 
In contrast, people with a high neuroticism score are more positional regarding “goods” 
than “bads” (.14 vs. .07) with a statistically significant difference (p-value = .067).  Finally, 
people with high PR scores show significantly lower positional concern (p-value = .047) 
regarding “bads,” possibly because of the high degree of empathy and cooperative behavior 
demonstrated by people in this personality. 
 
Is the Evidence Consistent with Predictions? The results so far indicate highly 
significant relationships between various personality characteristics and positional 
concerns. In Columns IV (a) and (b) of Table 2, we summarize our predictions about the 
relationship between specific personality characteristics and positional concern (a) and 
whether our results are consistent with the predictions (b). Column IV (a) uses the symbols 
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(-), (+), and (~) to characterize expected relationships as negative, positive, and a priori 
unknown, respectively. Column (b) uses symbols to indicate whether the expected and 
estimated signs are consistent (o), partially consistent o(p), inconsistent (x) or partially 
inconsistent x(p). The results suggest that the evidence is highly consistent with our 
expectations, except for extraversion (inconsistent) and NR (partially inconsistent). As 
discussed above, extraversion is expected to be positively associated with positionality. 
Yet, extraverts might also have lower positional concerns as they might be more empathetic 
to other people’s situations. Thus, the negative relationship found for “bads” might be due 
to the nature of the good considered. NR is expected to be positively related to positional 
concerns, which is in line with our estimates. However, our estimates are statistically 
imprecise. 
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Personality Traits and Positional Behavior Across Goods. The baseline model 
specification is estimated for each good in separate regressions. Note that splitting the 
experimental data by goods has an important disadvantage as it reduces the sample size in 
each estimation, which may affect the precision of the estimators. Nevertheless, to obtain 
the heterogeneity of personality on positional concerns across goods, the baseline model 
specification is estimated using the experimental data which are specific to each good. The 
heterogeneity results presented in Table 3 unveil important relationships. First, there is a 
substantial consistency in the signs and magnitudes of parameter estimates across goods 
compared with the ones presented previously. However, the significance levels show 
important variations for some personality characteristics and goods as well. Extraverts are 
significantly less positional when it comes to infant mortality and poverty rates, as reported 
above. The relationship is slightly stronger for the former. Agreeableness is negatively and 
statistically significantly related to positionality only for working hours/week and health 
expenditures. Conscientiousness and neuroticism are the two personality characteristics 
with the most consistent associations on positional concerns across the evaluated goods. 
Conscientiousness is positively associated with positionality, and the relationship is 
statistically significant for almost all goods. Neuroticism is also positive across all goods, 
but it is statistically significant only for income, market value of a car, and health 
expenditures. ILOC is significantly and positively related to positionality only for working 
hours/week, while ELOC is positively associated with positionality for the market value of 
a car, health expenditures, and poverty rates. NR is also positive and significant on 
positionality for market value of a car and health status. As previously reported, the 
parameter estimate of PR is negative and large for “bads”. Overall, most results are highly 
consistent with the predictions discussed above.  
 
4.2. Robustness 
 
Alternative Model Specifications. The model specification chosen for our baseline is an 
interval regression as we measure positionality in intervals with predetermined borders. 
One possibility is to interpret the positionality intervals as an ordinal data by assigning 
increasing ordered numbers for each marginal positionality interval. In this case, the 
specification in equation (2) is a standard ordered probit model where the borders of 
marginal positionality intervals are assumed to be unknown cut-off points, 𝜇𝜇𝑣𝑣. Using the 
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baseline sample, which combined the experimental results for all goods in one dataset, an 
ordered probit model is estimated and the results are presented in Column I of Table 4. 
Note that the magnitudes of parameter estimates cannot be directly compared with those 
of the baseline. We compare only signs and significance of estimates. The ordered probit 
model specification produces the same signs and significance levels for the Big-5 
characteristics, ILOC, and ELOC compared to those obtained from the baseline. Yet, this 
model specification suggests no statistically significant relationship between PR and 
positional concerns, albeit the sign is the same as in baseline. Among the unreported results, 
several alternative model specifications have also been estimated. First, we estimated the 
model with OLS and the results hardly changed. Second, we experimented with the vector 
of control variables used in the model specification. The results presented in Table 2 turned 
out to be robust with respect to combinations of control variables used and show hardly 
any noticeable difference compared with what of the baseline.  
 
Unobserved Heterogeneity and Endogeneity of Personality Traits. As in the bulk of 
the previous literature, this paper assumes that personality characteristics are relatively 
stable constructs that do not change significantly over time (Borghans, 2008; Heineck and 
Anger, 2010; Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013). People’s personalities have been found to 
develop before or during adolescence (age 10–19) and then remain stable for a long time.12 
Thus, it is fair to assume that the respondents in our experiment are old enough (ages 18–
27) to have completed the development of their personalities (Becker et al., 2012). The 
assumption that a person’s personality is fixed, at least for quite a few years, then allows 
us to consider personality characteristics as exogenous variables (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 
2013). However, some omitted variables, e.g., self-esteem, emotions, and mood 
characteristics, may be correlated with personality characteristics and therefore lead to bias 
in our estimators. To deal with this potential problem, we have already allowed our baseline 
model specification for the subjective inequality aversion, which is expected to be one of 
the key potential omitted variables. Yet, allowing the inequality measure in the model does 
not affect the results substantially.  
 
                                                 
12The stability of personality characteristics has long been discussed by personality psychologists (Roberts 
and DelVecchio, 2000; McGue et al., 1993; Costa and McCrae, 1988; 1994; Digman, 1989) and recently 
also by economists (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013; Boyce et al., 2013). Most studies in the literature report 
that personality characteristics are relatively stable across the life cycle.  
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Ideally, to deal with the endogeneity of personality, we would need a panel dataset with a 
fixed-effect model specification or a proper instrument for personality to identify the causal 
effects. Unfortunately, though, the experimental setup does not allow us to use either of 
these approaches. That is, the results presented in this paper are still simple correlations 
and should be interpreted with caution. However, we can suggest an alternative strategy. 
First, since our respondents make repeated choices characterized by a gradually increasing 
marginal degree of positional concern, we can interpret the experimental data as a panel 
dataset defined over the respondents and repeated choices for each good. Second, we 
specify a panel data random-effects model with alternative sets of potential “time-
invariant” characteristics that could capture unobserved individual characteristics in a 
Mundlak-type formulation, i.e., a correlated effects model.  
   
 23 
In our survey experiment, we elicited several proxy measures that are relatively stable and 
might be correlated with personality characteristics. The first one is PANAS (Positive and 
Negative Affects Scale)13, which aims at measuring positive and negative dimensions of 
moods and feelings (Watson et al., 1988). Individuals tend to experience positive and 
negative affects in a relatively stable pattern (Diener and Larsen, 1984) and these affects 
are found to be correlated with personality characteristics as well (Steel at al., 2008). 
Second, certain emotions such as envy of other people’s success or consumption levels 
may be correlated with both positional behavior and some personality characteristics, e.g., 
neuroticism. The approach suggested to measure individual differences in tendency to envy 
others is based on the Dispositional Envy Scale14 developed by Smith et al. (1999). Finally, 
a measure of self-esteem is generated based on the Rosenberg (1985) inventory.15 The 
literature identifies important relationships between people’s self-esteem, personality, and 
the degree to which they compare their consumption, appearance, and success with others 
(e.g., Aspinwall and Taylor, 1993; Suls et al., 2002; Vrabel et al., 2018). 
 
Merging the data for the respondents and their answers for each good generates 4,650 
respondents-goods-choice observations. In Column II of Table 4, we first present results 
from a linear random effects model using the variables controlled for in the baseline. The 
panel results are highly similar to those for the baseline except when it comes to 
agreeableness and PR. The parameter estimates of agreeableness are similar to those for 
the baseline, yet they are not precisely estimated. The estimated parameter of PR is very 
small compared with that of the baseline, and it is also statistically insignificant. The results 
of our correlated random-effects panel data model is given in Columns III and IV for two 
                                                 
13The scale is based on 20 questions aimed to measure positive and negative aspects of moods and feelings. 
More specifically, they measure to what extent individuals experience certain feelings such as attentiveness, 
happiness, and sadness. See Watson et al. (1988) for the full set of characteristics and details of constructing 
the measures for the positive and negative affects.  
14The inventory for the Dispositional Envy Scale is based on eight questions aimed to measure degree to 
which individuals feel envy (Smith et al., 1999). The inventory asks the respondents about their opinions 
on some statements (in seven points-scale), for instance, “I feel envy every day” or “Frankly, the success of 
my neighbors makes me resent them.” (see Smith et al. (1999) for the full inventory). We sum the answers 
for each question to construct the Dispositional Envy Scale.  
15Self-esteem is measured using the Rosenberg (1985) inventory, which includes ten statements. Individuals 
are asked to report their opinions about the statements on a 4-points-scale. Examples of statements include 
“I feel I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others” or “I am able to do things as well as 
most other people.” We sum ten questions and form the self-esteem scale.  
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alternative auxiliary functional forms of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. The 
correlated effects model given in Column III includes PANAS and the Dispositional Envy 
Scale. The result differs very little from those for the baseline (Column I of Table 2). Next, 
we add the self-esteem measure into the auxiliary distribution of the heterogeneity in 
Column IV. The results are very similar, except for extraversion. In this specification, we 
find a negative and partially significant relationship between extraversion and 
positionality. Among the unreported results, we also combined alternative sets of proxy 
measures in separate correlated-effects models and found highly similar measurements to 
those in Columns III and IV. In another specification check, we estimated a non-linear 
correlated effects model using PANAS, the Dispositional Envy Scale, and the self-esteem 
measure in a random-effects probit model. The parameter estimates (not the marginal 
effects) are presented in Column V of Table 4. In this model specification, the dependent 
variable is defined as one if a respondent chooses the positional alternative, and zero 
otherwise. The results are highly consistent with the baseline and the linear random-effects 
models presented in the previous columns.  
 
Order Effect. An important concern in the repeated stated choice experiments is the order 
effect, which might generate bias due to trend in the repeated answers to the binary choice 
questions. Respondents might get bored or tired, which can lead to bias in the observed 
preferences depending on the order of the questions asked. To alleviate this potential bias, 
we a priori design six alternative versions of the same experimental questionnaire where 
the goods are presented in different orders. Column VI of Table 4 presents results from 
baseline model specification (2), which includes six order dummies. The results are hardly 
affected. 
 
4.3. Heterogeneity of Positional Concerns by Levels of Personality Characteristics 
 
The results presented above suggest that several personality measures are significantly 
related to positional concerns. We now turn our attention to the heterogeneity of predicted 
mean degree of positionality across the levels of each personality trait. We first investigate 
how the degree of positional concerns differs from the overall mean degree across the levels 
of personality characteristics using our baseline parametric model. Then, in a detailed 
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analysis, a robust non-parametric estimator is exploited to investigate how the mean degree 
of positionality differs across the low and high values of each personality trait and good.  
 
Figure 2. Patterns of Positionality by Personality Trait 
 
  
Note: The figures are obtained from the baseline interval regression. Separate models are estimated for Big-5 
(A), locus of control (B), and reciprocity (C). We calculate the mean predictions and the standard errors for 
each values of personality and draw the 90% confidence intervals (vertical lines with caps). The horizontal line 
represents the overall mean degree of positional concerns, .492.  
 
 
Parametric Results. The mean degree of positionality is predicted using the estimated 
baseline specification (2), i.e., interval regression, for the levels of each personality trait 
while keeping other observed characteristics of each respondent at their mean levels. To 
be brief, mean predicted degree of positionality for the levels of each personality trait are 
presented in Figure 2. We use our pooled experimental dataset that includes all “goods” 
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and “bads” and the baseline specification given in equation (2). The three graphs show the 
predicted mean degree of positionality on the vertical axis and the observed levels of the 
respective personality traits on the horizontal axis. To add some flexibility, we include the 
quadratic function of each personality trait. We also tried alternative model specifications 
that included only a first- or third-degree polynomial, and the results turned out highly 
similar.  
 
Panel (A) of Figure 2 shows the heterogeneity in the levels of each Big-5 personality 
measure. Agreeableness (filled circles), conscientiousness (diamonds), and neuroticism 
(triangles) are strongly related to positional concerns. The vertical lines at each observed 
personality value are the 90% confidence intervals, which are used to investigate whether 
the mean degree of positionality is statistically different from the overall mean positionality 
for a particular level of each personality trait. The horizontal line at .492 represents the 
predicted conditional overall mean degree of positionality obtained from the baseline 
interval regression. The mean degree of positionality is heterogeneous around the overall 
mean for the low and also partially high levels of each personality trait. For instance, low 
values of agreeableness (filled circles) are related with a very high level of positionality. 
These findings are consistent with previous findings that low agreeableness is correlated 
with less prosocial, i.e., lower levels of cooperative behavior, and a higher degree of 
spiteful behavior, which might trigger higher positional behavior. Consistently, the mean 
degree of positional behavior is gradually lower as the level of agreeableness is higher.   
 
Low levels of conscientiousness (diamonds) are associated with very low levels of 
positional behavior, while the mean level of positionality is about the same as the overall 
mean degree of positionality for the higher values of conscientiousness (around median 
level, 12). Indeed, this result is highly in line with the predictions of personality 
psychology. Low conscientiousness is characterized by a tendency of laid back and a lower 
degree of success-driven behavior. Also, comparing the confidence intervals across the 
conscientiousness values suggests that the degree of positional concerns differ across the 
low and higher values. A partially similar pattern is observed for neuroticism (triangles). 
That is, lower values of neuroticism, i.e. higher emotional stability, are associated with 
lower mean positionality values (lower than the overall mean), and vice versa. We also 
find that the mean level of positionality is higher than the overall mean degree of 
positionality for very low values of extraversion (empty circles) and of openness-to-
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experience (empty squares). Note that the mean degree of positionality is almost the same 
for the median levels (12–14 on the horizontal axis) of each Big-5 personality trait, and for 
higher values of these traits, the mean degrees of positionality converge toward the overall 
mean degree of positionality, i.e., the horizontal line at .492. The results for ILOC and 
ELOC are given in Panel (B). As can be seen, the mean degree of positionality varies 
marginally across the ILOC values; there is only a slight positive slope. As for ELOC, the 
mean degree of positionality is significantly lower than the overall mean only at lower 
values. Comparing confidence intervals across the ELOC levels suggests that positional 
concerns are heterogenous across these levels. The final panel of Figure 2 (Panel C) 
presents the patterns for NR and PR. On average, positionality does not vary with 
reciprocity to any significant degree. 
 
Patterns by Goods: Non-Parametric Results. The results from the baseline parametric 
interval regression model in Figure 2 suggest that mean degree of positionality is 
heterogeneous around the overall mean degree of positionality, especially for the low and 
high levels of most personality traits. We will now present more detailed results for each 
good and will in particular focus on how the mean degree of positionality differs between 
the low and high levels of each personality trait. In order to define the low and high levels, 
we use the first and third quartiles of each personality trait. Then we compare the mean 
degrees of positional concerns of these two groups. One important remark is that the cell 
size in the first and third quartiles is small to obtain meaningful heterogeneity results with 
our baseline parametric model specification. To deal with potential bias due to small 
sample size, we use the Spearman-Karber estimator, which is a non-parametric and robust 
with respect to potential bias due to low sample size (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; 
Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002).  
 
The idea behind our choice of estimator is as follows. If a respondent chooses the positional 
alternative in a choice situation (which signals that the respondent has stronger positional 
concern than the one implied in the choice situation), then the respondent “survives” until 
the next choice situation, and so on. There are three choice situations where respondents 
can terminate in any choice situation or survive all three. Each choice situation is assigned 
an implicit degree of positionality, 𝜃𝜃�1, 𝜃𝜃�2, and 𝜃𝜃�3, and for each case a proportion of 
respondents survive, 𝑃𝑃1, 𝑃𝑃2, and 𝑃𝑃3. The Spearman-Karber estimator is then formed as: 
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Figure 3. Heterogeneity of Positionality by Goods: Non-Parametric Estimator 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔 = �∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗+1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗)(𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗+1)4𝑗𝑗=0 �/2,                                                                          (5) 
 
where we assume 𝑃𝑃0 = 0, 𝑃𝑃4 = 1, and 𝜃𝜃�0 = 0, 𝜃𝜃�4 = 1 for the lower and upper boundaries, 
and 𝜃𝜃�1 = .25, 𝜃𝜃�2 = .5, and 𝜃𝜃�3 = .75. The variance of the estimator is:  
 
𝑉𝑉[𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔] = �∑ �𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃�𝑗𝑗+1�2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗)/𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=0 � /4,                                                             (6) 
 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗  is the number of respondents who choose the positional alternative in each choice 
situation. Equation (6) is then used to calculate the confidence intervals of estimates.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the results for each good and can be interpreted as follows: vertical 
(dashed) lines represent good-specific overall mean level of positionality estimated with 
the non-parametric estimator. The mean degree of positionality for the low values of the 
personality traits is given by a triangle symbol and for high values of personality by circles. 
The lines around the circles and triangles represent 90% confidence intervals. Therefore, 
the figure shows not only whether the low and high values of each personality trait 
statistically differ from the good-specific overall mean but also whether the mean degrees 
of positionality of the low and high values of each personality trait statistically differ from 
each other. We drew a box around the cases where there is a statistically significant 
difference between the estimated mean degrees of positional concern associated with the 
low and high levels of the respective personality trait. Overall, the mean degrees of 
positionality associated with the low and high levels of the personality traits vary across 
the goods, which is highly in line with the average effects reported in Table 3. 
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
 
There is a growing interest in the relationship between personality characteristics and the 
economic outcomes of individuals. Drawing on the literature in this domain, this paper 
examines the direct relationship between a wide range of personality characteristics and 
the degree of positional concerns with respect to a number of goods using a tailor-made 
survey experiment. Our results suggest that there are substantial relationships between 
personality characteristics and positional concerns. In most cases, the signs and 
significance of the relationships are found to be consistent with recent studies (Budria and 
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Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2018; Cuesta and Budria, 2015) based on the life-satisfaction surveys. 
The results further demonstrate that the relationships between personality traits and 
positional concerns differ not only across different goods and but also across the values of 
each personality trait. The results are robust with respect to estimators, potential 
confounding factors, and order effects. 
 
Our paper can be concluded as follows. First, as previously demonstrated by many studies 
in the literature, respondents show a substantial level of positional concerns, although we 
note considerable variation across goods in this regard. The overall mean level of positional 
concern is found to be about .49, which is highly in line with the previous literature (e.g., 
Alpizar et al., 2005; Akay et al., 2013). Second, most personality characteristics are 
significantly related to the degree of positional concern. The association between 
agreeableness and positional concerns is negative, while conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
and external locus of control are positively related. Third, the relationship between 
personality and positionality differs depending on the good considered. While 
conscientiousness and neuroticism are significantly related to positional concerns 
regarding most goods, extraversion and positive reciprocity play a significant role only for 
the “bads.” The signs and significance of these relationships are highly consistent with the 
suggestions provided in the field of personality psychology. Finally, we show that mean 
degree of positionality across the levels of personality characteristics are heterogeneous 
across the lower and higher values of most personality characteristics. One important 
finding of this paper is that, in most cases, the association between personality traits and 
positional concerns are stronger for the lower values of each personality trait. A low score 
on agreeableness, for instance, relates to a very strong positional behavior, while low 
conscientiousness and neuroticism scores relate to less positional behavior. The analysis 
also unveils that while the degrees of positionality differ significantly between the lower 
and higher values of some personality characteristics, the mean level of positionality 
converges toward the overall mean level of positionality for the medium-to-high values of 
most personality characteristics.  
 
Overall, this paper brings a new set of evidence regarding the relationship between 
personality characteristics and positional concerns using a survey-based experiment. Our 
results offer important conceptual implications. Considering that the personality 
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characteristics constitute a set of proxies of non-cognitive skills, these skills relate to 
positionality when they are in lower levels. That is, the higher edge of these skills does not 
necessarily translate into a better or worse economic outcome. Our results call for further 
investigation of the relationship both in methodological and conceptual terms and suggest 
that the relationship between personality and economic outcomes should be interpreted 
with caution in economic models that takes non-cognitive skills into account. Most 
importantly, future research should investigate why personality characteristics and 
positional concerns are strongly associated mostly at the lower levels and why most non-
cognitive skills tend to generate similar positionality outcomes at their higher levels. 
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Appendix A. The Survey Experiment (After-tax Income/Month) 
Income of your future relative (1) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
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         Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TL/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TL/month after tax 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1800 TL/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1400 TL/month after tax 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
 
 
Income of your future relative (2) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
        Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TL/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TL/month after tax 
 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1550 TL/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1300 TL/month after tax 
 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
 
 
Income of your future relative (3) 
In the situation below, make a choice between society A and society B for your future relative. 
         Society A: – Your relative’s income is 2000 TL/month after tax 
                                  – The average income in society is 2200 TL/month after tax 
 
        Society B:      – Your relative’s income is 1220 TL/month after tax 
                                 – The average income in society is 1160 TL/month after tax 
 
Everything, including the price levels, are same in two societies. In both societies your relative works 40 
hours per week and this is equal to the average weekly work hours. Choose the society in which your 
future relative will be most content. 
Society A  Society B  
    
 
 
Appendix B. Personality Inventories and Measures 
 
B.1. Big-5 personality inventory 
 
   
 38 
Table B.1. Big-5 Inventory     
I see myself as someone who...   
   Q1. ...does a thorough job 
  
   Q2. ...is communicative, talkative  
  
   Q3. ...is sometimes somewhat rude to others  
  
   Q4. ...is original, comes up with new ideas 
  
   Q5. ...worries a lot  
  
   Q6. ...has a forgiving nature  
  
   Q7. ...tends to be lazy  
  
   Q8. ...is outgoing, sociable  
  
   Q9....values artistic experiences  
  
 Q10. ...gets nervous easily  
  
 Q11. ...does things effectively and deficiently  
  
 Q12. ...is reserved  
  
 Q13. ...is considerate and kind to others  
  
 Q14. ...has an active imagination  
  
 Q15. ...is relaxed, handles stress well      
a. Own collection and calculations by authors. 
b. The respondents were given the following instruction: “Here indicate how closely you agree with the 
statement by checking one of the boxes on the scale from 1 to 7. 1 means you completely disagree, and 7 
means you completely agree. If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in 
between.” 
c. The inventory is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).  
d. The components of the Big-5 measure are calculated as follows: Extraversion: Q2 + Q8 + Reversed(Q12); 
Agreeableness: Q3 + Q6 + Reversed(Q13); Conscientiousness: Q1 + Reversed(Q7) + Q11; Neuroticism: 
Q5 + Q10 + Reversed(Q15); Openness-to-experience: Q4 + Q9 + Q14; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.2. Internal and External Locus of Control 
 
Table B.2. Locus of Control Inventory     
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   Q1. How my life goes depends on me 
  
   Q2. Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve  
  
   Q3. What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck  
  
   Q4. If a person is socially or politically active, he/she can have an effect on social 
conditions  
  
   Q5. I frequently have the experience that other people have a controlling influence 
over my life 
  
   Q6. One has to work hard in order to succeed  
  
   Q7. If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities  
  
   Q8. The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions   
  
   Q9. Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can make  
  
 Q10. I have little control over the things that happen in my life     
a. Own collection and calculations by authors. 
b. The respondents were given the following instruction: “Here indicate how closely you agree with the 
statement by checking one of the boxes on the scale from 1 to 7. 1 means you completely disagree, and 7 
means you completely agree. If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in 
between.” 
c. The inventory is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).  
d. Internal locus of control measure is calculated as Q1 + Q6 + Q9 and external locus of control is 
calculated by adding the response scores for the remaining questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.3. Positive and Negative Reciprocity 
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Table B.3. Reciprocity Inventory     
    
   Q1: If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it    
   Q2: If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what 
the cost  
  
   Q3: If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her    
   Q4: I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before    
   Q5: If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back    
   Q6: I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before      
a. Own collection and calculations by authors. 
b. The respondents were given the following instruction: “Here indicate how closely you agree with the 
statement by checking one of the boxes on the scale from 1 to 7. 1 means you completely disagree, and 7 
means you completely agree. If your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in 
between.” 
c. The inventory is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).  
d. The positive reciprocity measure is calculated as Q1 + Q4 + Q6 and the negative reciprocity measure is 
calculated as Q2 + Q3 + Q5. 
 
